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I. INTRODUCTION 
Short sales of real property represent approximately a quarter of all 
homeowner transactions.1  Recently, short sales passed foreclosures as the 
preferred method in home sales due to the ease of sale.2  Coker v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A.,3 has ruled lenders of a purchase–money mortgage may not 
pursue a deficiency judgment after the short sale of a home.4  Essentially, this 
means after the sale is completed and the lender has obtained the proceeds from 
the sale, if there is a deficiency, they may not personally hold the borrower 
liable for the remaining debt of the mortgage.5  The ruling was established under 
                                                
1 Alejandro Lazo, Short Sales in California Surpass Sales of Foreclosed Homes, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2013,  http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/08/business/la-fi-short-sales-20130109. 
2 Id.  
3 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
4 Id. at 557. 
5 Id. at 565. 
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section 580b of California’s anti-deficiency legislation6 after the court 
interpreted section 580b to include short sales within its purview.7  On the 
surface, the decision affects the large sales transaction section of short sales.8  
However, the decision has further implications, such as the court’s interpretation 
basis, limiting freedom of contract, and efficacy of anti-deficiency legislation.9 
Anti-deficiency legislation was enacted during the Great Depression, 
creating strong implications the legislation was created for the purpose of 
avoiding similar situations.10  The following will discuss the historical 
background of anti-deficiency legislation with focus on the court’s treatment of 
section 580b.11  Additionally, the Coker opinion will be analyzed to bring out 
the court’s support for its interpretation of section 580b, which will later be used 
to discuss the full impact of its decision and if that decision is in line with 
avoidance of economic downturn.12 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
California’s anti-deficiency legislation was created in response to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.13  The legislation involves many basic 
requirements creditors must comply with to obtain outstanding funds.  Some of 
the basic requirements include: (1) the obligation of a single lawsuit combining 
the secured debt and unsecured debt;14 (2) requiring creditors to pursue the 
secured portion of the mortgage first before a deficiency judgment is 
attempted;15 (3) creditors must establish a procedure to follow when obtaining a 
                                                
6 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 2014). 
7 Id.  
8 See id.  
9 See infra Part V and accompanying notes 170–229. 
10 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560. 
11 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 13–66. 
12 See infra Part IV–V and accompanying notes 74–229. 
13 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560: 
  
California has an elaborate and interrelated set of foreclosure and anti-
deficiency statutes relating to the enforcement of obligations secured by 
interests in real property.  Most of these statutes were enacted as the result 
of the Great Depression and the corresponding legislative abhorrence of the 
all too common foreclosures and forfeitures [that occurred] during that era for 
reasons beyond the control of the debtors. 
 
Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see Charles B. Sheppard, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b, Anti-Deficiency 
Protection Regarding Purchase Money Debts: Arguments for the Inclusion of Refinanced Purchase 
Money Obligations Within the Anti-Deficiency Protection of Section 580b, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
245, 249 (1997). 
14 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 2014). 
15 See id.  
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deficiency judgment;16 (4) purchase–money mortgage deficiency restrictions;17 
(5) limitations on power-of-sale foreclosure deficiencies;18 and (6) limitations on 
short sale deficiencies.19  The remainder of this section will focus on the 
historical development of section 580b and how courts have applied the statute 
against short sales. 
Section 580b—purchase–money mortgage deficiency restrictions—was 
enacted in 1933.20  The statute restricts the obtainment of a deficiency judgment 
tied to a purchase–money mortgage after the sale of real property under a 
vendor-vendee relationship or secured by a one to four family home.21  Many 
                                                
16 See id. § 580a. 
17 See id. § 580b. 
18 See id. § 580d. 
19 See id. § 580e. 
20 Stats. 1933, ch. 642, § 5, p. 1673.  As originally enacted, section 580b read as follows: “No 
deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale under a deed of trust or mortgage given to 
secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.”  Id. 
21 CIV. PROC. § 580b: 
 
(a) No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event for the following: (1) After a 
sale of real property or an estate for years therein for failure of the purchaser 
to complete his or her contract of sale.  (2) Under a deed of trust or mortgage 
given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of 
that real property or estate for years therein.  (3) Under a deed of trust or 
mortgage on a dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to 
secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the 
purchase price of that dwelling, occupied entirely or in part by the purchaser. 
(b) For purposes of subdivision (c), a loan described in paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (a) is a “purchase money loan.” 
(c) No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event on any loan, refinance, or 
other credit transaction (collectively, a “credit transaction”) which is used to 
refinance a purchase money loan, or subsequent refinances of a purchase 
money loan, except to the extent that in a credit transaction, the lender or 
creditor advances new principal (hereafter “new advance”) which is not 
applied to any obligation owed or to be owed under the purchase money loan, 
or to fees, costs, or related expenses of the credit transaction.  Any new credit 
transaction shall be deemed to be a purchase money loan except as to the 
principal amount of any new advance.  For purposes of this section, any 
payment of principal shall be deemed to be applied first to the principal 
balance of the purchase money loan, and then to the principal balance of any 
new advance, and interest payments shall be applied to any interest due and 
owing.  The provisions of this subdivision shall only apply to credit 
transactions that are executed on or after January 1, 2013. 
(d) Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been 
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of 
both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time 
under any one thereof if no deficiency judgment would lie under the deed of 
trust or mortgage on the real property or estate for years therein. 
 
Id.; Purchase Money Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/purchase-
money_mortgaged.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“[A purchase–money mortgage is a] mortgage 
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amendments have brought the statute to its current state.22  The last amendment 
                                                
issued to the borrower by the seller of the home as part of the purchase transaction.  This is usually 
done in situations where the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage through traditional lending 
channels.  This is also known as seller or owner financing.”). 
22 Stats. 1935, ch. 650, § 5, p. 1806 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 
2014)); Stats. 1935, ch. 680, § 1, p. 1869 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 
2014)) (“No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of 
the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust or mortgage given to secure 
payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.”); Stats. 1949, ch. 1599, § 1, p. 2846 
(current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 2014)).  The 1949 amendment altered 
section 580b by adding the following: 
 
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property 
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of 
trust or mortgage given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price 
of real property.  
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been 
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of 
both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time 
under any one thereof. 
 
Id.; Stats. 1963, ch. 2158, § 1, p. 4500 (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 2014)).  The 1963 
amendment of section 580b provided as follows: 
 
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property 
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of 
trust, or mortgage, given to [secure payment of the balance of the purchase 
price of real property] the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the 
purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a 
dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure repayment 
of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of such 
dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser. 
 
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been 
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of 
both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time 
under any one thereof if no deficiency judgment would lie under the deed of 
trust or mortgage on real property. 
 
Id.; Stats. 1989, ch. 698, §12, p. 2289 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 
2014)).  The 1989 amendment of section 580b read as follows: 
 
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after [any] a sale of real 
property or an estate for years therein for failure of the purchaser to complete 
his or her contract of sale, or under a deed of trust or mortgage given to the 
vendor to secure payment of balance of the purchase price of that real 
property or estate for years therein, or under a deed of trust or mortgage on a 
dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure repayment 
of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of 
[such] that dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser. 
 
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been 
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of 
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transpired in 2012, extending the protection of 580b to include refinanced loans 
made after January 1, 2013, by incorporating refinanced loans within the 
definition of purchase–money mortgages.23 
Case law has been heavily active in defining section 580b.  The earliest 
cases used little legislative intent and relied on statutory language in coming to 
decisions.24  In Lucky Investments, Inc. v. Adams,25 further financing was 
obtained through a reconveyance of the original purchase–money loan.26  The 
issue was whether the loan would be considered a purchase–money mortgage 
despite the reconveyance.27  The court ruled a substitution of the form of an 
obligation did not result in loss of 580b protection because the original character 
of the loan remained intact.28  This case further defined the meaning of 
purchase–money mortgage and extended 580b safeguards.29  The Lucky opinion 
stated:  
[The court’s] conclusion does not work an undue hardship upon [the 
lender].  One who takes a purchase-money trust deed knows the 
value of his security and assumes the risk that it may become 
inadequate, especially where he takes a second purchase-money 
trust deed, and he is precluded by this section from bringing an 
action on the note after the security has become valueless because of 
the sale under the prior trust deed.30 
The statement focused on undue hardship, but by mentioning the lender’s 
assumption of risk, some insight of the purpose of 580b was provided.31  The 
court in Lucky did no further investigation of the purpose of why the purchase–
money loan should fall under this statute; it only established the loan fell under 
the purchase–money mortgage definition as a matter of statutory construction 
and public policy of inability to waive the statute through change of form.32  
Given the sole basis of statutory language for determining whether a 
                                                
both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time 
under the deed of trust or mortgage on the real property or estate for years 
therein. 
Id. 
23 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b(c). 
24 See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 101 (Cal. 1963).  The court in Roseleaf points 
to other courts’ lack of explanation why “purchase money mortgages were singled out for special 
treatment” and conclusions have been made assuming the 580b statute applies.  Id. 
25 7 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). 
26 Id. at 58–61. 
27 Id. at 59. 
28 Id. at 61. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id.  “Whatever the intent of the parties, [the parties] could not waive the protection 
of section 580b in advance.”  Id.  
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current case fell under anti-deficiency protection, it became difficult for courts 
to ascertain sound conclusions.33  California legislation had given little purpose 
upon the enactment of its anti-deficiency legislation, and it became clear 
judiciary interpretation of statutory intent was necessary to guide courts in their 
decisions.34  It was not until Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino35 the California 
Supreme Court rendered a paramount decision defining legislative purpose and 
intent behind section 580b.36  In Roseleaf, Roseleaf Corporation sold a hotel to 
Chierighino.37  Consideration given for the hotel consisted of a first deed and 
chattel mortgage from an unrelated party and three notes given to Roseleaf 
Corporation secured by three properties owned by Chierighino tied to a second 
deed of trust.38  Subsequently, the first deed of trust for the three parcels of land 
was foreclosed upon through power-of-sale.39  The foreclosure extracted all 
value from the second deed of trust, and Roseleaf Corporation filed suit against 
Chierighino to recover the outstanding balance.40  Chierighino asserted a 580b 
defense, stating the second deed of trust was not subject to a deficiency 
judgment.41  
The court in Roseleaf began its 580b analysis by stating the general 
application of section 580b:  
Section 580b was apparently drafted in contemplation of the 
standard purchase money mortgage transaction, in which the vendor 
of real property retains an interest in the land sold to secure payment 
of part of the purchase price.  Variations on the standard are subject 
                                                
33 See Brown v. Jenson, 259 P.2d 425, 427 (Cal. 1953) (reasoning “no deficiency judgment may 
be obtained regardless of whether the security later becomes valueless” because the statute provides 
protection for mortgagors).  But cf. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99–100 (Cal. 1963) 
(explaining the defined legislative purpose behind anti-deficiency legislation statute 580a: the fair-
market value limitations).  “Fair-value provisions are designed to prevent creditors from buying in at 
their own sales at deflated prices and realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for large 
deficiencies.”  Id.  The purpose of 580d, the denial of a deficiency judgment after a power-of-sale 
foreclosure, was to create an equal choice for the creditors.  Id. at 101–02.  Before the denial of 
deficiency judgments for nonjudicial foreclosures, it was always to the creditors advantage to 
foreclosure nonjudicially because of statutory redemption denial.  Id.  Statutory redemption gives the 
mortgagor who was foreclosed upon a right to purchase his property back for a certain time period 
after the sale but only for judicially foreclosed properties.  Id.  Denying the deficiency judgment of a 
nonjudicial foreclosure creates equality by guaranteeing a title that cannot be bought back.  Id. 
(noting there are past cases that decipher the purpose of section 580d).  
34 See Sheppard, supra note 13, at 262–63; Jamie O. Harris, California Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 580b Revisited: Freedom of Contract in Real Estate Purchase Agreements, 30 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 509, 510 (1993). 
35 378 P.2d 97 (1963). 
36 Id. at 99–100. 
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to section 580b only if they come within the purpose of that 
section.42 
The security transaction in the Roseleaf case was not a vendor-vendee type 
and, therefore, was not within the general application.43  The case made it 
necessary for the court to determine the purpose of 580b.44  In defining the 
purpose of the statute, the court distinguished other suggested, however, 
inappropriate reasoning by establishing compatibility between the inappropriate 
reasoning and other provisions within California’s anti-deficiency legislation.45  
By eliminating past reasoning, the Court narrowed its view on the purpose of 
section 580b and came to the conclusion the purchase–money mortgage anti-
deficiency statute was enacted to “serve[] as a stabilizing factor in land sales” by 
shifting the risk of inadequate security to the mortgagee.46  The risk shift 
prevents an overvaluation of the property by the vendor and “prevents the 
aggravation of the downturn that would result if defaulting purchasers were 
burdened with large personal liability.”47  Using the contrived purposes, the 
court went on to determine 580b did not apply to the case because the hotel was 
not overvalued, and it was unascertainable as to which party had more 
knowledge to value the property.48  
As stated above, anti-deficiency legislation is not subject to being waived, 
and courts have interpreted 580b and its purpose to justify their position of 
                                                
42 Id. at 100. 
43 Id. at 98, 100–02. 
44 Id. at 101. 
45 Id.  The court in Roseleaf demonstrated why other purposes courts proposed were not the 
correct purpose for section 580b.  Id.  The first purpose the Roseleaf court distinguished was 580b 
was created to prevent an unjust outcome by allowing the lender to obtain the property at an 
extremely low value and at the same time allow a deficiency judgment to be held against the debtor.  
Id.  The court continued to reason this purpose was not contemplated in section 580b enactment 
because fair-market value limitations already cover this purpose by ensuring the property be sold at a 
fair-market value.  Id.  The court also explained 580b singled out purchase –money mortgages for a 
particular reason and not for the reason of preventing double recovery given that many other 
mortgage types would be allowed to obtain the property at a low price and obtain a deficiency 
judgment.  Id.  
 The Roseleaf court disregarded a second purpose given in Brown, which stated, “the purpose of 
section 580b is to make certain that in the case of ‘a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust the 
security alone can be looked to for recovery of the debt.’”  Id. (quoting Brown v. Jensen, 259 P.2d 
425, 427 (Cal. 1953)).  The court in Roseleaf asserted the purpose given in Brown only stated a 
conclusion of how to apply the statute but gave no guidance on when to apply the statute in a 
scenario in need of statutory interpretation.  Id.  
 The last purpose the court in Roseleaf distinguished from the true purpose was the proposal “one 
taking a purchase money trust deed knows the value of his security and assumes the risk that it may 
become inadequate.”  Id.  The Roseleaf court believed this purpose was not a sufficient purpose to 
bar deficiency judgments for purchase–money mortgages.  Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 101–02. 
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borrower protection and inability to circumvent legislation.49  However, there is 
an exception to the non-waiving normality, which the court in Spangler v. 
Memel50 discovered.51  In Spangler, the court ruled waving of anti-deficiency 
legislation would be allowable if the two following conditions were satisfied: (1) 
there must be an ex post subordination agreement;52 and (2) the original land use 
must change.53  The court’s reasoning for the first requirement was the increased 
risk accompanying a subordination agreement.54  The second requirement 
involved change of purpose of the original financing, and, in turn, the loan 
amount was now based on the change in use, not the market value of the 
property.55  The two elements together virtually altered the characterization of 
the financing from a purchase–money type, and, because of that change, 
statutory language and legislative purpose remained intact.56  However logically 
sound the Spangler decision may appear, it has attracted some scrutiny in being 
incongruent with clear statutory language.57 
Section 580e bars all deficiency judgments from all lienholders “if the 
holder of said deed of trust consented to [a] short sale and received the proceeds 
of [that] sale as agreed.”58  Section 580e was effective as of July 15, 2011,59 but 
                                                
49 See Lucky Invs., Inc. v. Adams, 7 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (Cal. 1960). 
50 498 P.2d 1055 (Cal. 1972). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at  1059–61. 
53 Id. at 1059–60 (noting value is determined by the property’s change in use, not fair market 
value as a purchase–money mortgages use). 
54 Id. at 1061 (“[T]he risk of the failure of the commercial development is thrust upon the 
vendor.”). 
55 Id.  The market value of the land depends upon the likelihood of the success of the 
commercial development.  Id.  The success of the commercial development depends upon the 
obtaining of loans to construct it.  Id.  The securing of these loans depends upon the ability of the 
purchaser to give the lender a senior security interest.  Id.  
56 See id. at 1060–62. 
57 Harris, supra note 34, at 526.  “[I]n Spangler the Supreme Court adopted and then enlarged 
upon the unfortunate and unnecessary fictions created in the Brown and Roseleaf decisions that to 
create an exception to clear statutory language.”  Id.  The Spangler standard has also been subject to 
criticism due to its vague language of “commercial development,” “change in use,” and others.  Id. 
at 532. 
58 Marianne M. Jennings, From the Courts, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 493, 496–97 (2014); see CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (West 2014): 
 
(a)(1) No deficiency shall be owed or collected, and no deficiency judgment 
shall be requested or rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured solely 
by a deed of trust or mortgage for a dwelling of not more than four units, in 
any case in which the trustor or mortgagor sells the dwelling for a sale price 
less than the remaining amount of the indebtedness outstanding at the time of 
sale, in accordance with the written consent of the holder of the deed of trust 
or mortgage, provided that both of the following have occurred: 
(A) Title has been voluntarily transferred to a buyer by grant deed or by other 
document of conveyance that has been recorded in the county where all or 
part of the real property is located. 
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the question remained whether the statute would be applied retroactively.  Bank 
of America., N.A. v. Roberts60 took on the novel issue and found the statute 
cannot be applied prior to July 15, 2011.61  The court reasoned statutes are 
generally applied prospectively, and there must be specific express language 
directing application otherwise.62  There was no express language directing the 
statute to be applied in any other way than prospectively.63  The court went on to 
state its “interpretation [was] further confirmed by the legislative history” 
through the absence of any indication the statute was to be applied 
retroactively.64 
The outcome of the Bank of America decision resulted in all short sales 
prior to July 15, 2011, maintaining the ability to hold the borrower personally 
liable after the sale.65  This held true until five days later when Coker was 
decided, rendering attempts to obtain a deficiency judgment after a short sale 
useless.66  
                                                
(B) The proceeds of the sale have been tendered to the mortgagee, beneficiary, 
or the agent of the mortgagee or beneficiary, in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement. 
(2) In circumstances not described in paragraph (1), when a note is not 
secured solely by a deed of trust or mortgage for a dwelling of not more than 
four units, no judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note 
secured by a deed of trust or mortgage for a dwelling of not more than four 
units, if the trustor or mortgagor sells the dwelling for a sale price less than the 
remaining amount of the indebtedness outstanding at the time of sale, in 
accordance with the written consent of the holder of the deed of trust or 
mortgage.  Following the sale, in accordance with the holder’s written 
consent, the voluntary transfer of title to a buyer by grant deed or by other 
document of conveyance recorded in the county where all or part of the real 
property is located, and the tender to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or the agent 
of the mortgagee or beneficiary of the sale proceeds, as agreed, the rights, 
remedies, and obligations of any holder, beneficiary, mortgagee, trustor, 
mortgagor, obligor, obligee, or guarantor of the note, deed of trust, or 
mortgage, and with respect to any other property that secures the note, shall be 
treated and determined as if the dwelling had been sold through foreclosure 
under a power of sale contained in the deed of trust or mortgage for a price 
equal to the sale proceeds received by the holder, in the manner contemplated 
by Section 580d. 
Id. 
59 CIV. PROC. § 580e. 
60 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
61 Id. at 350. 
62 Id. at 352.  “[S]tatutes ordinarily are interpreted as operating prospectively in the absence of a 
clear indication of a contrary legislative intent . . . . In construing statutes, there is a presumption 
against retroactive application unless the [l]egislature plainly has directed otherwise by means of 
‘express language of retroactivity’ . . . .”  Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 Coker v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
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III. FACTS 
The facts of Coker will be laid out to give background and provide context 
for the following analysis.  Carol Coker owned real property located in San 
Diego, California.67  With Chase Home Finance (Chase) as the financing lender, 
Coker obtained a note that was secured by a deed of trust against the property in 
San Diego.68   Coker eventually went into default and negotiated a sale with a 
third party for less than the outstanding balance under the loan.69  Chase agreed 
to accept the terms of the third party deal on the condition Coker would stay 
liable for the excess balance left on the note.70 
After the sale, Coker was asked to pay the remaining loan balance.71  
Coker refused and responded by filing a declaratory relief action to settle 
whether she was able to obtain anti-deficiency protection after a short sale was 
conducted.72  The superior court sustained the Chase demurrer, ruling Coker 
would not receive anti-deficiency protection because the protection was only 
available for property that was sold through judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosure.73 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The main issue before the Coker court was whether 580b protection 
extended to short sales.74  Ancillary issues will be discussed in this analysis, as 
there were more mentioned in Coker; however, section 580b and its application 
to short sales will be the primary focus.75   
The court began its analysis by describing California’s two types of 
foreclosures: judicial and non-judicial.76  Carol Coker believed section 580b 
applied only to judicial and non-judicial foreclosures.77  A non-judicial 
foreclosure is one in which no judicial determination is necessary.78  Given the 
                                                
67 Id. at 557.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 557–58. 




75 Id.  The court in Coker first addressed the standard of review that would be used throughout 
the case.  Id.  It concluded the appropriate review would be one of de novo and all the pleaded facts 
would be taken as true.  Id.  
76 Id. at 559. 
77 Id. at 558. 
78 See id. at 559.  “[N]either appraisal nor judicial determination of fair value is required, and the 
debtor has no postsale right of redemption.”  Id. (quoting Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 
601, 607 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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minor impediments to complete a non-judicial foreclosure, the process is 
relatively quick and inexpensive.79  Under anti-deficiency law, if a non-judicial 
foreclosure is conducted, a deficiency judgment will be barred from recovery.80  
This is true even if the loan is not a purchase–money mortgage.81  The reasoning 
behind the deficiency denial is to place power-of-sale foreclosures and judicial 
foreclosures on parity.82  Judicial foreclosures allow for a statutory redemption 
right, and power-of-sale foreclosures do not.83  If a lender chooses to non-
judicially foreclose, the title will be free and clear of any past mortgagor right to 
purchase the property back after foreclosure completion.84 
A judicial foreclosure requires the foreclosing party to file a lawsuit and 
establish the loan is in default.85  The process takes a longer period of time to 
complete than the non-judicial foreclosure due to court oversight.86  The key 
difference between non-judicial and judicial foreclosure with regard to anti-
deficiency legislation, is the foreclosing party will only be denied a deficiency 
judgment if the loan was a purchase–money loan.87  If the loan is not a 
purchase–money loan, a deficiency judgment will be available as long as all 
other anti-deficiency provisions comport.88 
In Coker, it was undisputed whether there was a judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosure.89  In its place, a short sale occurred to fulfill Coker’s mortgage 
obligation after default.90  A short sale occurs when the lender agrees to take less 
                                                
79 Id.  “Nonjudicial foreclosure is less expensive and more quickly concluded than judicial 
foreclosure, since there is no oversight by a court . . . .”  Id. (quoting Alliance, 900 P.2d at 607). 
80 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 2014). 
81 See id. 
82 See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 101–02 (Cal. 1963): 
  
 [S]ection 580d was enacted to put judicial enforcement on a parity with 
private enforcement. This result could be accomplished by giving the debtor a 
right to redeem after a sale under the power.  The right to redeem, like 
proscription of a deficiency judgment, has the effect of making the security 
satisfy a realistic share of the debt.  By choosing instead to bar a deficiency 
judgment after private sale, the [l]egislature achieved its purpose without 
denying the creditor his election of remedies.  If the creditor wishes a 
deficiency judgment, his sale is subject to statutory redemption rights.  If he 
wishes a sale resulting in nonredeemable title, he must forego the right to a 
deficiency judgment.  In either case the debtor is protected.  
 
Id. at 102.  
83 Id. 
84 See id. 
85 Arabia v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
86 Coker v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
87 CIV. PROC. § 580b. 
88 See id.; id. § 580a (requiring for a foreclosure to be sold close to its fair market value to 
prevent lenders from a “double recovery”). 
89 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 559. 
90 Id. 
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than the mortgage owed in full satisfaction of the outstanding balance.91  The 
short sale agreement stated, as many other short sale agreements state, the 
mortgagor would still be liable after the security had been sold.92  Section 580b 
does not specifically state conducting a short sale will result in a forfeit of 
deficiency judgments on a purchase–money loan.93  Again, the question remains 
whether the subsequent agreement between the borrower and lender preventing 
deficiency judgments will be enforced or precluded under section 580b of 
California’s anti-deficiency statute. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
The court laid the foundation for how the statute would be interpreted by 
reminding the reader of the context that drove anti-deficiency legislation through 
creation and passage and by confining the core analysis to the language of the 
statute.94  The context in which the statute was created was during the Great 
Depression, and the section 580b language used by the court was the following:  
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after a sale of real 
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his or her contract 
of sale under a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling given to a 
lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay 
all or part of the purchase price of that dwelling.95 
The statute was amended to only include purchase–money mortgages for 
one to four family homes, which was the type of property handled in Coker.96  
When looking at the plain meaning of the language, the court referred to 
Aozora Bank to support its view by citing broad language from the opinion 
stating a purchase–money loan is a non-recourse loan in California and, 
therefore, the lender’s only recourse option was to obtain and sell the security.97  
The Aozora opinion indicated the loan in the case was non-recourse and, if 
section 580d applied after a power-of-sale foreclosure, there would likely be no 
possibility of a deficiency judgment.98  The Aozora court did not state purchase–
                                                
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 558. 
93 See CIV. PROC. § 580b. 
94 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560.  “Words must be construed in context, and statutes must 
be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.”  Cal. Mfrs. Assn. v. 
Public Utils. Comm’n, 598 P.2d 836, 840 (Cal. 1979). 
95 CIV. PROC. § 580b. 
96 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560. 
97 Id.  “Section 580b addresses purchase-money loans and establishes that they are non-recourse 
loans under California law.  ‘In a nonrecourse loan…, the borrower has no personal liability and the 
lender’s sole recourse is against the security for the obligation.’”  Id. (quoting Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. 
1333 N. Cal. Boulevard, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 
98 Aozora, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 341–42. 
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money loans under section 580b were non-recourse after all types of property 
sales.99  Nevertheless, the court in Coker drew its starting point, maintaining 
purchase–money mortgages are considered non-recourse loans and recovery 
would be limited to the security proceeds.100  The language analysis was tapered 
when the Budget Realty court’s application of section 580b in a vendor-vendee 
setting was cited, which also resulted in a non-recourse loan.101 
The court went on to state liberal construction of the statute and broad 
interpretation has historically been the trend for anti-deficiency legislation.102  It 
stated deficiency circumvention of any type would undermine the purpose of the 
580b statute.103  The court used Prunty v. Bank of America,104 to support its view 
of broad interpretation, barring circumvention of 580b.105  In Prunty, a 
construction loan used to build a dwelling was ruled to fall under 580b 
protection.106  The loan was not technically a purchase–money loan because the 
loan was not used to purchase the property; instead, it was used for 
construction.107  However, the court in Prunty went against the strict language of 
the statute and concluded the loan was synonymous with a purchase–money 
mortgage because it fit within the purpose of anti-deficiency legislation.108  
                                                
99 See id. at 344 n.3.  “[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether the fee award after the nonjudicial 
foreclosure was a deficiency judgment prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure section 580d.”  Id. 
(showing the court never made a binding conclusion on whether there would be a bar on deficiency 
judgments following the triggering of an anti-deficiency event). 
100 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560. 
101 Id. (citing Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter, 204 Cal. Rptr. 48, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating 
the protection covered a vendor-vendee relationship as one of two purchase–money mortgage 
situations included in the statute)). 
102 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560. 
103 Id. at 561. 
104 112 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
105 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561. 
106 Prunty, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 378–79. 
107 Id. at 372. 
108 Id. at 376–77: 
   
 The final question in the present case is whether the broader language should 
be interpreted to bar a deficiency judgment after a sale ‘under a deed of trust 
(plaintiffs’) given to a lender (defendant bank) to secure repayment of a loan 
which was in fact used to pay all or part’ of the [c]ost of constructing 
plaintiffs’ ‘dwelling occupied by the borrower(s) (plaintiffs).  
 The common—and various—definitions of the words ‘purchase’ and 
‘purchaser’ are sufficiently flexible to include the suggested alternative 
meanings; the owner of real property who finances and builds a ‘dwelling’ on 
it ‘acquires’ or ‘obtains’ the dwelling for a ‘price,’ in no less a sense than the 
‘purchaser’ of real property ‘acquires’ or ‘obtains’ the land itself.  The 
flexibility of both definitions has been recognized in pertinent decisions.  
 In the present case, it seems particularly appropriate that the ‘risk,’ and the 
ensuing loss in consequence, be borne by defendant bank because of the 
opportunities it had—and utilized—to protect its security interest against the 
landslide loss, which actually occurred.  These opportunities included the 
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Prunty has been described as arguable, but the Coker court adhered to its 
reasoning and assessed its case through a broad lens of interpretation.109  
The court stated the legislation was passed to accomplish two purposes.110  
The first was to prevent overvaluation of property.111  Lenders will be less likely 
to overvalue the property with 580b in place because the larger the gamble they 
take on a higher loan amount, the less likely they are to receive that full amount 
if a default were to occur.112  Protecting borrowers in unfortunate economic 
times was the second purpose the court put forth.113  “[I]f inadequacy of the 
security results, not from overvaluing, but from a decline in property values 
during a general or local depression, section 580b prevents the aggravation of 
the downturn that would result if defaulting purchasers were burdened with 
large personal liability.”114  In turn, 580b functions as a stabilizing device in land 
sales.115  The court described these public policy goals are achieved by means of 
section 580b shifting the risk to the lender.116 
Using both the language and purpose interpretation, the court in Coker 
concluded section 580b was not limited to foreclosures as the lender 
                                                
control exercised by the bank over the plans, specifications[,] and construction 
of plaintiffs’ residence in contemplation of landslide and other physical risks, 
and the requirement in plaintiffs’ trust deed that they furnish insurance whose 
coverage protected the bank against loss and which was ‘satisfactory’ to it.  
We may reasonably assume that such protective measures are readily 
available to lenders who finance residential construction, that the [l]egislature 
was aware of this when it amended section 580b in 1963, and that its 
protection of residential construction borrowers, against deficiency judgments, 
was continued (under the 1963 amendment) in recognition of the fact that the 
lenders involved are able to protect themselves against loss of devaluation of 
their security which might be caused by physical catastrophe.  Under these 
and all the circumstances previously discussed, we hold that section 580d bars 
a deficiency judgment in the present case. 
 
Id. at 376–78.  
109 Union Bank v. Anderson, 283 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991): 
  
 Prunty arguably fell within section 580b following a 1963 amendment adding 
the protection afforded a “dwelling,” and was likely aimed at eliminating the 
inequitable situation where the purchaser of real property with an existing 
house was protected by section 580b and the purchaser of real property who 
later built a house on the lot was not. 
 
Id. 
110 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. 
113 Id. 
114 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 101 (Cal. 1963). 
115 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561. 
116 Id. 
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proposed.117  The court reasoned, because the statute did not include specific 
language concerning the mode of sale, nor modification of the term “sale,” it 
was not limited to foreclosure sales.118  Further, the phrase “in any event” in 
section 580b provided intention of application toward any type of sale.119  Coker 
referred to other courts that have similarly held “foreclosure[s] [are] not a 
prerequisite trigger to section 580b’s protections.”120  The interpretation was far-
reaching and of liberal construction, as promised.121 
Section 580e applies to property sales in which the “sale price [is] less 
than the . . . amount of indebtedness outstanding at the time of the sale, in 
accordance with the written consent of the holder of the deed of trust or 
mortgage,” also known as a short sale.122  The Coker court claimed its view was 
reinforced through the enactment of section 580e for a number of reasons.123  
First, and most evident, is for the reason of 580e being a part of the anti-
deficiency legislation group and its instruction to bar deficiency judgments of 
short sales.124  Secondly, the legislative history of section 580e referred to 580b 
application of short sales and how protection is provided by 580b for purchase–
money mortgages that result in short sales.125  Section 580e differed mainly in 
its expansion in not limiting the application to purchase–money mortgages and 
provided protection for all mortgages subject to short sales.126  According to the 
court, 580e was primarily passed for reasons of expanding protection of all loans 
arising from a certain mode of sale; however, it was not found 580e was passed 
to ensure 580b applied to purchase–money loans arising from short sales.127  A 




120 Id.; see Frangipani v. Boecker, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 407 –10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding 
580b protection was available despite the fact the sale may not be subject to the deed of trust; in 
other words, may not be a foreclosure); see also Venable v. Harmon, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1965) (holding 580b applied preventing a deficiency judgment and the fact there had not been 
a sale did not preclude that protection). 
121 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561. 
122 Id. at 562 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (a)(1) (West 2014)). 
123 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.  
124 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 562.  This first reason alone is weak because section 580e 
was passed long after section 580b was in place.  There is no way to know section 580e related in 
any way to cover portions 580b was meant to protect at the time 580b was passed.  The court’s 
second reason suggesting 580b was mentioned in the passage of section 580e provides some 
evidence to support its interpretation of 580b applying to short sales but is not conclusive the 
passage of 580e alone should be construed to mean Congress intended section 580b apply to short 
sales.  Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See id.  “[T]he purpose of this proposed legislation is primarily to protect distressed 
homeowners who have non-purchase money recourse loans on residential property.”  Id. (combining 
the aforementioned language with the 580e language, which clearly indicated the application to short 
sales only, the purpose is evident). 
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deeper dive into legislative history revealed further support, which highlighted 
the reasoning of 580e limiting its application to short sales through the 
preexisting assumption 580b applied to all purchase–money mortgages, no 
matter the mode of sale.128 
Chase purported, because 580d pertains to only foreclosures, 580b must 
also be limited to foreclosures.129  The court disagreed with that claim while 
again mentioning the stark difference in the language used between sections 
580d and 580b.130  “In summary, we conclude the plain language of section 
580b, its purpose (as consistently determined by California courts), and the 
language of other anti-deficiency statutes makes clear that section 580b applies 
to the short sale here.”131 
B. The Security–First Rule 
The next issue the court addressed was if section 580b was not applicable 
as a result of the “security–first” rule being waived.132  Section 726, also known 
as the “security–first” or “one–action” rule, applies when the debtor asserts its 
right for the creditor to pursue the security first, before enforcing the amount 
necessary to fill any unpaid debt.133  In the current case, Chase took the position, 
                                                
128 See id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  “The phrase ‘in any event after a sale’ in section 580b stands in stark contrast to section 
580d, which applies only where the real property ‘has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under 
power of sale contained in the mortgage or deed of trust.’”  Id. 
131 Id. at 562–63 
132 Id. at 563. 
133 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 2014): 
  
 (a) There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property or an estate 
for years therein, which action shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter. In the action the court may, by its judgment, direct the sale of the 
encumbered real property or estate for years therein (or so much of the real 
property or estate for years as may be necessary), and the application of the 
proceeds of the sale to the payment of the costs of court, the expenses of levy 
and sale, and the amount due plaintiff, including, where the mortgage provides 
for the payment of attorney’s fees, the sum for attorney’s fees as the court 
shall find reasonable, not exceeding the amount named in the mortgage. 
 (b) The decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust secured by 
real property or estate for years therein shall declare the amount of the 
indebtedness or right so secured and, unless judgment for any deficiency there 
may be between the sale price and the amount due with costs is waived by the 
judgment creditor or a deficiency judgment is prohibited by Section 580b, 
shall determine the personal liability of any defendant for the payment of the 
debt secured by the mortgage or deed of trust and shall name the defendants 
against whom a deficiency judgment may be ordered following the 
proceedings prescribed in this section.  In the event of waiver, or if the 
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because Carol Coker never asserted her section 726 right, a deficiency judgment 
shall be payable from Coker.134  Chase heavily relied on the reasoning in Scalese 
v. Wong,135 which the Coker court distinguished from its case.136 
In Scalese, appellants purchased a five-unit apartment building by 
securing a purchase–money loan through assumption.137  Instead of staying on 
track with the payment schedule, the appellants wanted to pay the full mortgage 
at an earlier time than originally agreed upon.138  Appellee reacted by not 
allowing the payment, and appellants responded by refusal to make scheduled 
payments.139  In turn, appellee filed suit requesting specific performance and 
                                                
prohibition of Section 580b is applicable, the decree shall so declare and there 
shall be no judgment for a deficiency.  In the event that a deficiency is not 
waived or prohibited and it is decreed that any defendant is personally liable 
for the debt, then upon application of the plaintiff filed at any time within 
three months of the date of the foreclosure sale and after a hearing thereon at 
which the court shall take evidence and at which hearing either party may 
present evidence as to the fair value of the real property or estate for years 
therein sold as of the date of sale, the court shall render a money judgment 
against the defendant or defendants for the amount by which the amount of 
the indebtedness with interest and costs of levy and sale and of action exceeds 
the fair value of the real property or estate for years therein sold as of the date 
of sale.  In no event shall the amount of the judgment, exclusive of interest 
from the date of sale and of costs exceed the difference between the amount 
for which the real property or estate for years therein was sold and the entire 
amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or deed of trust.  Notice 
of the hearing shall be served upon all defendants who have appeared in the 
action and against whom a deficiency judgment is sought, or upon their 
attorneys of record, at least 15 days before the date set for the hearing.  Upon 
application of any party made at least 10 days before the date set for the 
hearing the court shall, and upon its own motion the court at any time may, 
appoint one of the probate referees provided for by law to appraise the real 
property or estate for years therein sold as of the time of sale.  The probate 
referee shall file the appraisal with the clerk[,] and the appraisal is admissible 
in evidence.  The probate referee shall take and subscribe an oath to be 
attached to the appraisal that the referee has truly, honestly[,] and impartially 
appraised the real property or estate for years therein to the best of the 
referee’s knowledge and ability.  Any probate referee so appointed may be 
called and examined as a witness by any party or by the court itself.  The court 
shall fix the compensation, in an amount as determined by the court to be 
reasonable, but the fees shall not exceed similar fees for similar services in the 
community where the services are rendered, which may be taxed and allowed 
in like manner as other costs. 
Id. 
134 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 563 (arguing because section 726 was not raised, a deficiency 
judgment was then available as an election, which the court found incorrect). 
135 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
136 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 563–64. 
137 Scalese, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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judicial foreclosure.140  At no point during the initial filings or at trial did the 
appellants assert the one–action rule.141  
The trial court found the purchase–money mortgage indicated a 
prepayment would not be an available option allowed by the agreement.142  
Accordingly, appellee was successful and received an election of remedies.143  
The election of remedies was either to enforce the specific performance of 
monthly payments owed or commence a judicial foreclosure.144  When the 
appellee elected the specific performance remedy, appellants did not assert their 
section 726 right to have the security exhausted first.145  
On appeal, appellants argued the damage award was incorrect because 
appellee may have only pursued the remedy offered under section 580b.146  The 
appellate court ruled against the appellants’ argument because the following 
sequence was met: First, appellants never brought up the security–first rule, and, 
in turn, waived that right;147 and, second, appellee elected to waive the security 
interest to receive the specific performance granted.148  Technically, section 
580b “never [came] into play” because there was no sale of security.149  
The Coker court distinguished Scalese on many grounds.150  In Scalese, 
the court dealt with the possibility of a judicial foreclosure, which never came to 
realization.  Additionally, a completed short sale did not transpire, as in 
Coker.151  The issue in Scalese was a breach of contract issue on whether 
prepayment would be permitted stemming from the appellants refusal to make 
payments on time and appellee’s refusal to accept a full prepayment.152  After 
                                                
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 42: 
  
[A]ppellants did not assert section 726 as a defense to the complaint.  Further, 
at the time respondent made the election at the conclusion of trial, appellants 
voiced no objection and did not demand that the security be exhausted.  The 
record shows that after respondent made the election, the court asked counsel 
for appellants if he wished to be heard.  Counsel replied “I [do not] know if 
[there is] anything I can say.  I mean, that’s the remedy [the respondent] 
wants.” 
 
Id. at 43–43.  




146 Id. at 44. 
147 Id. at 43–44. 
148 Id. at 44. 
149 Id. 
150 See infra notes 151–57 and accompanying texts.  
151 Coker v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 557–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); 
Scalese, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41. 
152 Scalese, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. 
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the court decided appellee’s argument was correct and appellants failed to 
answer with a one–action rule, the appellee proceeded by electing to receive the 
back payments.153  Dissimilarly, the issue in Coker was whether a deficiency 
judgment was available after a short sale occurred.154  There was a possibility of 
a power-of-sale foreclosure, but the short sale took its place and was 
completed.155  The resulting deficiency was nonexistent in Scalese.156 
In addition, the appellants retained ownership of the apartment in Scalese.  
Thus, if the court of appeals determined section 580b applied, the appellants 
would have received a windfall.  They would have owned the apartment free and 
clear without any liability on the note.  In holding section 580b was not 
applicable, the court sought an equitable result where the appellants owned the 
apartment but were personally liable for the missed payments on the note, and 
the appellee had given up its security interest in the apartment.  However, Coker 
no longer owned her residence, having sold the property to a third party.  Chase 
received the proceeds of that sale.157 
The connection Chase drew between section 726 and section 580b was 
incorrect.158  It would be incorrect to state failure to invoke the one–action rule 
will result in loss of 580b protection.159  Instead, it would be precise to posture 
failure to complete a sale will result in no effect on section 580b because the 
statute has not yet been triggered; there must first be a sale for section 580b to 
be triggered.160  There was only a possibility of judicial foreclosure in Scalese; 
the actual sale did not occur due to the appellant’s failure to invoke section 726 
and the decision of the appellee to not conduct the sale.161  The facts are clear in 
Coker a short sale occurred.162  The Coker court decided the cases were 
distinguishable, and, in turn, section 580b applied.163 
                                                
153 Id.   
154 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 558–59.  
155 See id. at 557.  
156 See Scalese, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43. 
157 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 564.  
158 See infra notes 159–63 and accompanying texts.  
159 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 2014); see also id. § 580b (West 2014): 
 
 Failure to invoke the one-action rule creates an election of remedies available 
to the lender.  In order for 580b to come in contact with the failure to invoke 
the one-action rule the lender must also elect to receive the security through a 
sale and that sale must be completed.  If that sequence is satisfied the lender is 
subsequently barred from a deficiency judgment due to the fact that the 
security was the chosen remedy.  
 
Id.  
160 See CIV. PROC. § 580b (West 2014). 
161 Scalese, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41.  
162 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 558. 
163 Id. at 565. 
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C. Waiver 
The court also ruled, consistent with other cases, a waiver of section 580b 
would be unavailable as a matter of public policy.164  The cornerstone case, 
considered the only situation that allows a waiving of section 580b, is Spangler 
v. Mermel.165  The Spangler case can be classified not as a waiver but a change 
of loan character.166  The loan was no longer a purchase–money mortgage; 
instead, it was classified as a subordinate construction loan.167  The Coker court 
found the loan character in its case was far from the Spangler loan, because the 
loan in Coker was never changed from a purchase–money mortgage.168  The 
finding there was no loan character change from a purchase–money mortgage 
leads to the conclusion there may not be a waving of section 580b as a matter of 
public policy.169    
V. JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND SOCIAL IMPACT 
The central impact of the Coker decision may seem fairly limited because 
it renders all unpaid debt in direct connection with a purchase–money mortgage 
following a short sale valueless.170  Further, the decision only immediately 
affects short sales completed before July 15, 2011, because after that date, under 
section 580e, a lender may not collect unpaid debt following a short sale on any 
type of mortgage.171  However, when the decision is teased out, there are more 
legal and social ramifications that exist.172  The following section will discuss 
the impact the Coker decision places on the legal and social world.  
                                                
164 Id.  The language of 580b is: 
 
 [E]xplicit and unambiguous . . . [:] A vendor cannot obtain a [deficiency] 
judgment against a purchaser in a purchase money secured land transaction.  
[There is no wiggle room] in the statute that would permit a vendor to enforce 
a waiver of its protection in exchange for other concessions.  To do so would 
circumvent the absolute rule and flout its very purpose.  
  
Lawler v. Jacobs, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 52, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  The Supreme Court has held 
“provisions of section 580b . . . may not be contractually waived by the debtor in advance of or at 
the time a purchase money obligation is incurred.”  Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 602–04 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  
165 498 P 2d. 1055, 1060–1062 (Cal. 1972). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 See id. at 1061; Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 558.  
169 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565.  
170 Id.  
171 Id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (West 2014).  
172 See infra Part V.A–B and accompanying notes 173–229. 
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A. Liberal Statute Construction & Broad Interpretation 
The Coker court stated liberal statute construction and broad interpretation 
accompany California’s anti-deficiency legislation.173  Although the court’s 
view can provide equitable results, it also provides opportunity for judicial 
activism.174  
                                                
173 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 1061; see also Prunty v. Bank of Am., 112 Cal. Rptr. 370, 
373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).  The Prunty court cited a few sources explaining how the court should 
interpret the statute: “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain 
the intent of the [l]egislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. . . . Statutes should be 
construed so as to be given a reasonable result consistent with the legislative purpose.”  Id. (quoting 
People v. Superior Court, 449 P.2d 230, 237 (Cal. 1969)).  “Moreover, ‘. . . a statute should be 
construed with reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in such a way that 
harmony may be achieved among the parts . . .’”  Id. (quoting Merrill v. DMV, 458 P.2d 33, 40 (Cal. 
1969)).  We are to construe the express language of a statute “according to the usual, ordinary import 
of the words employed, but in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the 
statute.”  Id. (quoting People v. Superior Court, 449 P.2d at 237).   The Prunty court followed its 
interpretation preface with the following statement: 
 
Applying these rules in the interpretation of section 580b in particular (or of 
any of the other components of the “entire statutory system” of anti-deficiency 
legislation which includes it), we must also recognize that the “system” has 
been liberally construed to effectuate the specific legislative purpose behind it.  
As one writer has stated, “. . . the courts have exhibited a very hospitable 
attitude toward the legislative policy underlying the anti-deficiency legislation 
and have given it a broad and liberal construction that often goes beyond the 
narrow bounds of the statutory language.” 
 
Prunty, 112 Cal. Rptr.. at 373–374  (quoting Stefan A. Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing 
Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 705, 709 (1960)).   It should be noted the Prunty court 
cited court cases in its anti-deficiency interpretation preface but cited to a law review article when 
expanding the scope of interpretation to liberal construction and broad interpretation.  Id.  
174 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565; see also Prunty, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 443; cf. Thomas L. 
Murphy, The Dangers of Overreacting to “Judicial Activism”, UTAH B.J., 38, 39 (2006).  The 
Murphy article defined “judicial activism” as the court either reading the text of law in a “rigid” 
manner or a liberal manner to get the result it ultimately wants, while having little case law, history, 
or other established legal references to support its conclusions.  See id.  Reinert defined “judicial 
activism” as the point when the “[c]ourt ha[s] overstepped its role as interpreter of the law and 
instead engage[s] in legislating.”  Joseph A. Reinert, The Myth of Judicial Activism, VT. B.J., 35, 35 
(2004).  The term “judicial activism” refers to a family of views concerning the nature of 
constitutional interpretation and the institutional role of the court.  William Marshall divides the term 
into seven categories:  
 
(1) Counter-Majoritarian Activism: the reluctance of the courts to defer to the 
decisions of the democratically elected branches; (2) Non-Originalist 
Activism: the failure of the courts to defer to some notion of originalism in 
deciding cases, whether that originalism is grounded in a strict fealty to text or 
in reference to the original intent of the framers; (3) Precedential Activism: 
the failure of the courts to defer to judicial precedent; (4) Jurisdictional 
Activism: the failure of the courts to adhere to jurisdictional limits on their 
own power; (5) Judicial Creativity: the creation of new theories and rights in 
constitutional doctrine; (6) Remedial Activism: the use of judicial power to 
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Prunty, for example, came to an “equitable” result.175  The court decided 
although the loan was technically a construction loan, it was intrinsically used as 
a home purchase and, therefore, fell within section 580b protection.176  Prunty is 
a prime example of judicial activism used to come to the most equitable result in 
the court’s opinion.177  To some, the result is equitable because, although the 
loan did not fit the exact definition of the statute, the result was aligned with the 
situation the statute was intended to protect.178  
On the other hand, the result in Prunty can be viewed as inequitable.  The 
inequitable view stems from the thought the law should be predictable in its 
application.179  In other words, court decisions should stick to the plain meaning 
of the contested anti-deficiency legislation to keep the law reasonably 
foreseeable in its true function.180  Another resolution available to increase 
predictability of application would be to allow the waiver of section 580b.181  A 
waiver would produce expected results, but California courts have continuously 
struck these attempts down as a matter of public policy.182  
The Coker court affirmed the use of liberal construction and broad 
interpretation, meaning the court’s decision leaves room for judicial activism.183  
Those against laws being interpreted outside the plain language can find some 
                                                
impose ongoing affirmative obligations on the other branches of government 
or to take governmental institutions under ongoing judicial supervision as a 
part of a judicially imposed remedy; and (7) Partisan Activism: the use of 
judicial power to accomplish plainly partisan objectives.   
 
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1217, 1220 (2002).  The definitions are all related to a similar core, but in the context of this article 
the definition Murphy uses is closer to the meaning portrayed in the text for the reason the court in 
Coker is leaving itself an option to read the anti-deficiency legislation in a manner it sees fit.  
Murphy, supra  at 39; cf. Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560–61.  
175 See Prunty, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 383; see also Union Bank v. Anderson, 283 Cal Rptr. 823, 827 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to the Prunty decision as avoiding an inequitable result).  
176 Prunty, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 378–79.. 
177 See id.  
178 See id; see also Anderson, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 827.  The court in Prunty cited a law review 
article to reach its ideal interpretation.  The citation could be considered outside the traditional court 
interpretation scope.  Prunty, 112 Cal. Rptr  at 373–74. 
179 Robert Justin Lipkin, We Are All Judicial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 182 (2008).  
“Judicial activism [is] considered by many to be the scourge of American constitutionalism . . . .”  
Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Harris, supra note 34, at 510.  “More principled and predictable decisions would be based on 
the negotiated agreements of the parties, including contractual waivers of section 580b protection 
when they are agreed to.”  Id. 
182 See Coker v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); 
Lawler v. Jacobs, 100 Cal Rptr. 2d 52, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 
600, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
183 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560–61.  
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consistency in the court’s historical defense of borrowers.184  The anti-deficiency 
trend has historically run in favor of mortgagors, which can provide some 
predictability in application.185 
B. Purpose Establishment & Freedom to Contract 
The court in Coker reaffirmed the longstanding purpose of 580b that was 
defined in Roseleaf.186  The main purposes were defined as: (1) discouraging the 
overvaluation of property by shifting the risk to the seller; and (2) a stabilization 
factor to prevent aggravation during an economic downturn.187  In Roseleaf, 
these purposes were backed with limited legislative authority, and, further, no 
empirical evidence was used to support the outcome.188  Despite these facts, the 
court found two purposes.189  
The first of the two purposes contemplates mortgagees will not overvalue 
their property by keeping the loan-to-value ratio low and, in turn, maintain a 
lower default possibility.190  The first purpose the court manufactured is one 
factor to consider when discouraging overvaluation; however, there are many 
other factors that could be considered:  
While the loan to value ratio of total debt secured by the property is 
certainly one factor affecting that risk, it is not the only one, and 
may be less significant than other factors such as cash flow of the 
property, the buyer/borrower’s income and other assets, the relative 
size of the loans in comparison to each other, and perceived trends 
in real estate values.  Thus, is unlikely to discourage overvaluation, 
and may in fact promote overvaluation in an otherwise hot market 
because buyers can increase their offers on paper without fear of 
personal liability.191 
                                                
184 Id.  Because the court has been moving in this direction since inception of anti-deficiency 
legislation, it can be seen the court is not a “precedential activist” as defined in William Marshall’s 
article.  See Marshall, supra note 174.  
185 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561; Prunty v. Bank of Am., 112 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373–74 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1974). 
186 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561. 
187 Id.; see Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 100–01 (Cal. 1963).  
188 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561; Harris, supra note 34, at 515.  
189 Roseleaf, 378 P.2d at 101. 
190 Id.; see Harris, supra note 34, at 515.  
191 Harris, supra note 34, at 516–17: 
  
In a dynamic real estate market many factors influence the willingness of a 
buyer and seller to agree on price and terms and hence affect fair market 
value.  Such factors include existing and potential future uses of the property, 
perceived direction of changes in the market, availability and cost of 
financing, governmental restrictions, zoning laws, environmental conditions, 
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The purposes may not have the most substantial support, but the courts do 
not seem to be moving away from the Roseleaf interpretation, and California 
legislation has not amended section 580b to reflect a different purpose than the 
court proposed.192  Though “legislative acquiescence in prior judicial decisions 
is not conclusive in determining legislative intent,”193 the court in Coker made 
no reference to challenge the purpose given in Roseleaf, which further 
established that purpose as the baseline for section 580b’s interpretation on 
issues varying from the text.194  
The patent impact of the Coker decision is stated in its holding: 
“The explicit language of section 580b brooks no interpretation 
other than that deficiency judgments are prohibited by a purchase 
money mortgagee so long as a purchase money mortgage or deed of 
trust is in effect on the original real property.”  There is no dispute 
that the loan in place at the time of the short sale was a purchase 
money loan.  Section 580b applies after a sale of the property, and 
                                                
tax impacts, terms and conditions for payment, and general economic 
conditions.  
 Id. 
There simply is no empirical basis for the notion, espoused in Brown and 
adopted in Spangler, that sellers as a group necessarily have more knowledge 
of the value of their properties than do buyers, or for the idea that any 
construct of law is needed to prevent sellers from “overvaluing” their 
properties.  Sellers naturally want the highest price they can get and buyers 
naturally want the lowest, but who has the most knowledge about value in a 
given transaction is a function of individual market sophistication, not a 
function of status as a buyer or a seller. 
 
Id. at 524.  
192 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 561.  There were two amendments to section 580b after the 
Roseleaf decision, one of which did solve some related confusion.  See supra notes 17–18; cf. Harris, 
supra note 34, at 538: 
 
[D]o away with the unpredictability of a rule based on an ill-defined notion of 
“standard” transactions, speculative statutory “purposes,” confusion about the 
meaning of value, and vague ideas of equity between buyers and sellers as 
potentially victimized classes, clarity in the law and predictability in the 
market place should be established by adherence to two basic propositions in 
580b subordination cases: [(1)] As Brown v. Jensen determined, “ in no event 
“ does 580b permit a deficiency judgment on a note secured by a purchase-
money deed of trust on the property sold.  As interpreted in Brown v. Jensen, 
the words “in no event” preclude a deficiency judgment in the event of a sold-
out junior lien, unless the parties otherwise agree.  [(2)] The parties to real 
estate transactions involving purchase-money deeds of trust should be free to 
bargain about waiver of 580b protection.  
 
Harris, supra note 23, at 538–39. 
193 DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim, 976 P.2d 843, 848 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Stop Youth 
Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Cal. 1998)). 
194 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 561.  
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there is no requirement in the statute that a foreclosure must occur to 
trigger its protections.  Further, those protections cannot be 
waived.195 
The court has decided 580b does apply to short sales and is not limited to 
foreclosures.196  Taking a narrow view of the holding, the case is limited to 
extending protection to short sales, which means there may be other types of 
property sales that are, in form or substance, altered from one of the protected 
sale types and may not fall under the purview of section 580b.197  If a broad or 
expanded view of the holding is taken, it could be interpreted to bar all 
purchase–money mortgage sales from a deficiency judgment, regardless of the 
sale type.198  Additionally, the court emphasized if protection under section 580b 
is obtained, it cannot be waived.199 
The broad view of the holding leaves little room for freedom of contract 
around section 580b due to the public policy argument.200  Given the difficulty 
of section 580b circumvention, lenders will have to adapt and become more 
creative in avoiding, circumventing, or controlling financial damage of the 
section 580b statute.  One of the most common methods used to ensure a lender 
obtains the full value of the loan is to procure a guaranty.201  A guaranty is a 
promise given to a lender by a guarantor to ensure full payment of the loan if the 
debtor becomes unable to fulfill his or her obligations.202  If section 580b applies 
to a sale, the debtor is essentially unable to personally pay for the excess 
deficiency the security could not satisfy.203  If the lender obtains a guaranty, the 
guarantor would not be liable, and section 580b would allow circumvention of 
this type.204  Section 580b specifically states:  
The fact that no deficiency shall be owed or collected under the 
circumstances set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) does not affect the 
liability that a guarantor, pledgor[,] or other surety might otherwise 
                                                
195 Id. at 565 (quoting Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)). 
196 Id.  
197 See id.  
198 See id.  The broad interpretation is likely the interpretation the court has adopted given the 
analysis focused more on if a sale was completed, not on the fact it was a short sale.  Id.  
199 Id.  The court gives only public policy as its reasoning for the inability to waive.  Id.  Aside 
from public policy, the only other reasoning the court and other courts allude to is stare decisis.  
Harris, supra note 34, at 546.  Further, at one point in time it was held 580b could be waived by 
subsequent actions of the borrower.  Cf. Russell v. Roberts, 114 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
200 See Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 565.  
201 Carl D. Ciochon, Guarantor Liability – A Litigation Perspective, WENDEL ROSEN (Sept. 1, 
2008), http://www.wendel.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=content.contentDetail&ID=9018. 
202 Financial Guarantee, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-
guarantee.asp. 
203 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 2014).  
204 Id.  
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have with respect to the deficiency, or that might otherwise be 
satisfied in whole or in part from other collateral pledged to secure 
the obligation that is the subject of the deficiency.205 
A guaranty is now a more important consideration when lending; 
however, securing a guaranty is not as rock-solid as it sounds.206  First, the 
lender must find a willing guarantor, which in itself may not be an easy task.207  
Next, even if the guarantor is obligated and they are called upon to fulfill their 
obligation, there are a number of defenses a guarantor may assert.208  Some of 
these defenses include suretyship, “sham” guaranty, contract defenses, and 
others.209  In these situations, 580b does keep its efficacy in protecting the 
                                                
205 Id.  
206 See Ciochon, supra note 201. 




California law nominally provides strong protections for guarantors as well.  Known as 
“suretyship defenses,” these protections severely restrict the lender’s ability to recover from 
the guarantor (who is sometimes described as a “surety”).  Significantly, these suretyship 
defenses may be waived by the guarantor.  Accordingly, most common forms of guaranty, 
particularly those used by institutional lenders, contain broad waivers of all potentially 




California’s powerful anti-deficiency protections are deemed nonwaivable as a matter of 
public policy.  The sham guaranty rule effectuates this policy by voiding guaranties that 
attempt to circumvent these protections.  The classic application of the sham guaranty rule 
arises in the context of a general partnership.  Because the partners of a general partnership 
are jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s obligations, the law views the partners 
and the partnership as essentially one and the same.  Accordingly, a partner’s guaranty of 
the partnership’s real estate secured obligations will be deemed an invalid sham guaranty.  
Whether the sham guaranty defense is applicable in other situations, such as a guaranty of a 
limited partnership’s obligations by a limited partner, an LLC’s obligations by a member, or 
a corporation’s obligations by an officer or shareholder, will depend on the facts presented.  
Although courts frequently uphold guaranties in these circumstances, if the guarantor can 
present evidence that the “purpose and effect” of the guaranty was to “subvert” California’s 




A guaranty is subject to the full panoply of traditional contract defenses, such as incapacity, 
unconscionability, illegality, duress, fraud, and mistake, as well as equitable defenses such 
as waiver and estoppel.  The applicability of these defenses will depend upon the facts 
presented.  In general, the closer the transaction appears to the ideal of an arms length 
transaction negotiated by sophisticated parties represented by counsel, the less likely these 
defenses are to succeed.  By the same token, the farther the facts stray from this ideal, the 
greater the possibility a court may find one or more of these defenses applicable, 
particularly if there is evidence of lender misconduct. 
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borrower but does not place the burden on lenders when estimating property 
value, and there is no evidence supporting the fact securing a guarantor will 
assist with possible economic downturn. 
Perhaps the most common method of obtaining a guaranty arises in the 
context of Veteran Affairs (VA) or Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
loans.210  These mortgages are issued through federally qualified lenders and 
insured by the FHA or VA.211  Therefore, in the case of a mortgagor default, the 
federal government will pay the lender, and the government could pursue a 
deficiency judgment as a guarantor.212  In Carter, veterans brought an action 
under Idaho law to enjoin VA insured loans from their recourse attempt on an 
outstanding deficiency.213  The Idaho law essentially prevented lenders from 
obtaining deficiency judgments after nonjudicial foreclosures.214  The court 
described the applicable federal law as follows:  
When a veteran takes advantage of the VA guarantee program, two 
legal relationships are established, both of which are governed by 
federal law.  First, the VA promises to reimburse the lender if the 
veteran defaults, up to the face value of the guarantee.  Second, the 
veteran promises to reimburse the VA for any amount the VA pays 
the lender.  This is an obligation owed directly to the VA, which it 
may recover by subrogating itself to any remaining rights of the 
lender or by pursuing an independent right of indemnity against the 
veteran.215 
The court went on to state the issue was not one of preemption because the 
state and federal statutes did not conflict.216  Instead, the state statute simply did 
not apply to the federal government; federal law governs the VA.217  Along the 
                                                
Id.  
210 Federal Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Federal_takeover_of_Fannie_Mae_and_Freddie_Mac#Ongoing_status_of_Fannie_and_Freddie_con
servatorship (last updated Sept. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Federal Takeover]. 
211 FHA Loan, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fhaloan.asp (last updated 
2014). 
212 See Carter v. Derwinski, 987 F.2d 611, 612 (9th Cir. 1993). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 612–13.  “Whitehead v. Derwinski involved the Washington foreclosure scheme, which 
is similar to Idaho’s.  Like Idaho, Washington allows both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures.  
Washington permits deficiency judgments after a judicial foreclosure, but prohibits them altogether 
after a nonjudicial foreclosure.”  Id. at 612.  
215 Id. at 612; 38 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012) (describing the authority to bind lenders to terms and 
conditions of the insurance); 38 U.S.C. § 3720 (2012) (giving authority to pursue veterans in the 
event of deficiency); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4321 (2010) (stating the promise to reimburse the lender).  
216 Carter, 987 F.2d at 616.  
217 Id.: 
 
We need not decide whether the Idaho foreclosure scheme is preempted.  
Whether and under what circumstances the state deficiency procedures might 
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court’s line of reasoning, federal subrogation and indemnity remained intact, and 
pursuit against the veteran for the outstanding balance was valid.218 
FHA and VA loans have saturated the market, consuming over half of all 
the single-family mortgages in the United States.219  Lenders have taken 
advantage of this market by becoming federally qualified and receiving their 
insurance.220  A federal guaranty of this type may become more common in 
California and other states with anti-deficiency provisions to provide lenders 
with the necessary protection they need in the event of a deficiency, essentially 
eliminating anti-deficiency legislation.221 
Another method lenders may use to overcome the deficiency bar of 
section 580b is to attempt to convert the loan to a subordinated loan under a 
construction loan and, therefore, fall within the Spangler exception.222  For a 
lender to purposefully accomplish the Spangler exception, it must have the 
opportunity to do so by attaching the loan to an upcoming or anticipated 
construction project.223  A lender could conceivably finance a home purchase 
that borrowers intend to substantially modify on or are convinced to build upon, 
subordinate their loan, change the land use to construction, and waive section 
580b with consent of the borrower.224  It is the only waiver exception that has 
been allowed by the courts and many variables must fall in place for the waiver 
to be honored, making it difficult for lenders to attain.225  A mortgagee would 
likely attempt a waiver of this kind if he had knowledge there were plenty of 
                                                
produce a lesser recovery than an action on the federal indemnity right [is not] 
pertinent.  Such analysis incorrectly assumes that the VA must comply with 
the state scheme in order to recover from the veterans.  Regardless of the 
method by which a lender proceeds against a defaulting veteran—even when 
it does so at the VA’s direction—the VA always possesses a right of 
indemnity against the veteran for the amount of guarantee paid to the lender.  
This is an independent right of indemnity, created by federal law, which state 
courts must honor. 
 
Id.  
218 Id.  
219 Federal Takeover, supra note 210. 
220 FHA Requirements: Debt Ratios, FHA.COM, http://www.fha.com/fha_requirements_debt 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2014).  The requirements promulgated by the FHA are in place to increase the 
likelihood the potential mortgagor will stay solvent throughout the mortgage.  There are essentially 
two requirements that must be satisfied by the potential mortgagor to qualify: (1) the mortgage 
payment to effective income ratio must be a maximum of thirty-one percent and (2) the total fixed 
debt to effective income must be a maximum of forty-three percent.  Id.  
221 All Praise to the New Subprime – 1 out of 6 FHA Insured Loans Is Now Delinquent. Offering 
30x Leverage with FHA Loans., DR.HOUSINGBUBBLE (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.doctorhousing-
bubble.com/fha-new-subprime-30x-leverage-fha-insured-loans-bailout/.  
222 See Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1062 (Cal.  1972). 
223 Id.  
224 Id.  
225 Id.  
2014       JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CA ANTI-DEFICIENCY LEGISLATION        251 
 
other assets the mortgagor possessed or strongly believed the construction 
project would be lucrative, to maintain full recovery of any deficiency that may 
occur.226 
Out-of-state lenders in states that do not have anti-deficiency legislation 
have an advantage in recovering deficiencies, even if the mortgage is tied to real 
property situated in California.227  Generally the governing law of the debt for 
which the mortgage was obtained will be used to decide the case on that 
particular issue, but there have been some conflicting decisions.228  If it is 
                                                
226 See id. at 1056–57.  In Spanger, the newly constructed building was not commercially 
successful due to lack of tenants.  Id.  This lack of occupancy caused the mortgagor to fall behind on 
payments and, in turn, triggered a cause of action to obtain the deficiency.  Id.  Preferably, a lender 
would like to have both a commercially successful project, as well as plenty of personal assets to 
insure the possible loss.  Id.  
227 See John H. Shadduck, Application of California’s Antideficiency Statutes in Conflict of 
Laws Contexts, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1332, 1347–48 (1985). 
228 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 229 (1971): 
 
Issues which do not affect any interest in the land, although they do relate to 
the foreclosure, are determined, on the other hand, by the law which governs 
the debt for which the mortgage was given.  Examples of such latter issues are 
the mortgagee’s right to hold the mortgagor liable for any deficiency 
remaining after foreclosure or to bring suit upon the underlying debt without 
having first proceeded against the mortgaged land. 
 
Id.  The choice of law issue that arises in many of these diversity cases is demonstrated in the 
following quotation:  
 
Section 580b bars a deficiency judgment on a purchase-money mortgage.  The 
leading conflict of laws case involving section 580b is Younker v. Reseda 
Manor, decided in 1967.  In Younker, a California corporation operating in 
Nevada bought land in Nevada financed in part by the Nevada domiciliary 
seller.  The indebtedness was secured by a purchase-money mortgage, 
apparently governed by Nevada law.  After foreclosure, the seller brought an 
action for the deficiency in California against the California corporation which 
had defaulted.  The California debtor claimed the action was barred by section 
580b, but the Nevada creditor argued that the court should apply Nevada 
law—which provided no purchase-money deficiency bar—since Reseda 
Manor was doing business in Nevada and all transactional contacts had 
occurred there.  The Younker court barred the deficiency judgment but 
obscured the doctrinal basis for its holding.  The opinion offered no evaluation 
of whether the policies underlying section 580b supported the application of 
the deficiency bar. 
By contrast, the court in Kish v. Bay Counties Title Guaranty Co. declared that 
in purchase-money financing of a Nevada property sale, the section 580b 
antideficiency rights were integrated into the contract, which was to be 
performed in California and was governed by California law.87  Neither the 
Kish nor the Younker holding is supported by an analysis of the policies 
underlying section 580b.  Because they apply section 580b inconsistently, and 
more importantly, because they lack policy analysis, Younker and Kish offer 
little guidance for evaluating section 580b in accordance with interest 
analysis. 
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decided a state’s law without anti-deficiency regulation is the governing law for 
the deficiency issue, an out-of-state lender could conceivably contract with a 
borrower, acquiring real estate in California, and avoid section 580b.229  It is a 
trend that could develop if recovery of debt becomes a pressing issue.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1930s brought the United States the longest sustained economic 
downturn of all time.230  In response, California took action to provide 
borrowers with protection, shift default risk to lenders, and prevent aggravation 
during times of economic downturn by enacting anti-deficiency legislation.231  
Courts relate to the historical background and some legislative history as the 
core when fabricating purposes of enactment of anti-deficiency legislation they 
believe will produce positive economic effects.232  As suggested above, the court 
in Roseleaf had little support in its use of liberal construction and broad 
interpretation of section 580b, and, in turn, diminutive reasoning when deciding 
the purpose of section 580b.233  
The Coker decision was based on the assumption Roseleaf’s view of anti-
deficiency purpose was unquestionably correct.234  Roseleaf’s standards made it 
comfortable for the Coker court to conclude the language in section 580b 
extended to protect borrowers after the completion of a short sale.235  The further 
support used by the court citing the passage of section 580e provided little, if 
anything, in drawing the conclusion 580e was a symbol of what Congress 
intended section 580b to protect.236  There was little legislative history to assist 
its conclusion in this aspect.237  On top of the fragile interpretation, the court 
reinforced the non-waivable anti-deficiency legislation precedent as a matter of 
public policy.238 
The immediate impact of short sale deficiency denial is apparent, but the 
court’s affirmation of anti-deficiency interpretation style, as well as purpose 
establishment, holds a long-term effect.239  The long-term effect forces lenders 
                                                
Shadduck, supra note 227.  
229 Shadduck, supra note 227. 
230 The Great Depression, HISTORY.COM (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/great-
depression. 
231 See supra Part II and accompanying notes 13–66. 
232 See supra Part IV–V and accompanying notes 74–229. 
233 Id.  
234 Coker v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 560–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
235 Id. at 565.  
236 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
237 Id. 
238 Coker, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565.  
239 See supra Part V and accompanying notes 170–229. 
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to stray away from using circumvention or waiver contracts with the borrower 
and find more creative ways to ensure they will receive the full loan amount in 
the event of a deficiency.240 
The overarching principal to take from the case is California courts will 
use expansive means to limit the freedom to contract when applying anti-
deficiency legislation.241  There have been limited exceptions allowed, but, for 
the most part, as a matter of public policy and stare decisis, waivers are not 
available.242  The court’s holding can be considered against the purposes given 
or counter-productive toward public policy, as many of the loans will be insured 
by the federal government or supplied with a guarantor, and, therefore, not 
subject to state law or push forward the purposes expressed.243  In turn, state law 
will have a small effect on the public, losing the economic effect of the purpose 
entirely. 
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243 See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes 173–185. 
